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Agency problems of excess endowment holdings
in not-for-profit firms

Abstract

We examine three alternative explanations for excess endowments in not-for-profit firms:
(1) growth opportunities, (2) monitoring, or (3) agency problems. Inconsistent with
growth opportunities, we find that most excess endowments are persistent over time, and
that firms with persistent excess endowments do not exhibit higher growth in program
expenses or investments. Inconsistent with better monitoring, program expenditures
toward the charitable good are lower for firms with excess endowments, and CEO pay
and total officer and director pay are greater for firms with excess endowments. Overall,
we find that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems.
JEL classification: G31; G35; G38; J33; L31
Keywords: Corporate governance; Not-for-profit; Cash holdings; Endowment; Agency
problems

1.

Introduction
Not-for-profit firms often maintain large endowments, and the determinants and

consequences of this unusual feature have received little study. An endowment is a fund
of cash and/or securities that the not-for-profit can use to finance current and future
expenses. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether there are agency problems
when not-for-profit firms (NFPs) hold excess endowment assets.1
We use as a basis of our study the literature that explores agency problems related
to cash holdings in for-profit firms (e.g., Jensen, 1986). Evidence on whether excess cash
results in agency problems in for-profit firms is mixed. Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and
Shleifer (1994) document excessive investment and acquisition activity for eleven firms
that experience a large cash windfall due to a legal settlement, and Harford (1999) finds
that firms with excess cash are more likely to make value-decreasing acquisitions.
Further, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) show that the market valuation of a firm’s
cash holdings is lower when agency problems are likely to be greater. In contrast, Opler,
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) document only modest evidence of greater
spending on new projects and acquisitions for a large sample of firms with high excess
cash.
Whether cash-related agency problems are present to a greater or lesser extent in
NFPs is an open question. On one hand, recent work by Fisman and Hubbard (2002)
argues that donors serve an important monitoring role in NFPs and minimize agency
costs. In addition, some of the more frequently cited cash-related agency problems in forprofit firms, such as excessive risk-reducing acquisitions, are likely to be less prevalent in

1

From this point forward, we use the acronym NFP in place of “not-for-profit.” In this paper, we use the
terms “not-for-profit” and “nonprofit” as synonyms.
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not-for-profit firms. NFP managers may have weaker incentives to engage in riskreducing activities because less of their wealth is concentrated in firm-specific assets (i.e.,
the future compensation of both nonprofit and for-profit managers has a firm-specific
element, but for-profit managers also have a large proportion of their wealth invested in
firm-specific stock and options).
On the other hand, cash-related agency problems are potentially exacerbated in
NFPs because unlike for-profits, NFPs have no residual claimants with strong monitoring
incentives. Further, cash endowment holdings by NFPs are, on average, substantially
larger than cash holdings by for-profits. In the spirit of Jensen (1986), Hansmann (1990,
p. 36) suggests that to ensure private benefits such as a light workload and increased job
security, NFP managers can have incentives to build endowments rather than provide
current services.2 Finally, there is no feasible method of returning unnecessary cash
holdings to donors. In other words, there is no analogue to the dividends and share
repurchases that for-profit firms use to return funds to shareholders.
Unlike shareholders in public firms, excess cash holdings can be costly to NFP
donors even when agency problems and transaction costs are low. In the absence of
agency problems and transaction costs, excess cash is not costly for public firm
shareholders: The extra cash lowers risk and expected return, and shareholders can access
the funds if needed by borrowing against the value of their shares. However, in NFPs,
excess cash holdings have an opportunity cost for donors: Donors have no ability to
borrow against these holdings and use the cash to fund projects in other areas or
industries. Thus, to the extent that an NFP holds cash in excess of its own needs, other

2

This suggestion is one of many reasons Hansmann (1990) discusses for why universities may hold
endowments.
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NFPs can be under-funded.3
We examine endowments in a broad sample of NFPs over the period from 1992 to
2001. We use the model developed by Fisman and Hubbard (2002) to form expectations
about firm-specific benchmark levels of endowment. We estimate a firm’s excess
endowment as the residual from yearly regressions based on this model. An excess
endowment can mean: (1) an endowment that is optimally larger in anticipation of firmspecific growth opportunities; (2) an endowment that is optimally larger because of
superior firm-specific monitoring; or (3) an endowment that is sub-optimally larger due
to firm-specific agency problems. Our tests are designed to distinguish between these
explanations.
Inconsistent with large endowments anticipating greater firm-specific growth
opportunities, we find that most firms with excess endowments maintain their excess
endowments for several years (i.e., they do not draw down their endowments to fund
growth). Furthermore, we find that firms with persistent excess endowments do not
exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. We conclude that growth
opportunities are unlikely to explain excess endowments for most NFPs, and that the
large endowments suggest either better monitoring or agency problems.
To distinguish between firm-specific better monitoring and agency problems as
potential explanations for excess endowments, we first examine the relation between
excess endowments and firm efficiency, which we measure using program expenses as a
fraction of total expenses (the program expense ratio). This ratio is a widely used proxy
for the efficiency with which total expenses are made toward charity instead of toward

3

Hansmann (1980, pp. 14-19) discusses the trade-off of the costs and benefits of deferring charitable
spending.
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fundraising and administration. Consistent with greater agency problems in firms with
excess endowment, we find that the program expense ratio is lower for firms with excess
endowments. As a second test to distinguish between the better monitoring and agency
problem explanations, we examine the relation between excess endowments and CEO
and total officer and director pay as proxies for private benefits accruing to management.
We find a positive association between excess endowments and compensation, which
again is inconsistent with the better monitoring explanation.

Our overall evidence

suggests that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems.
Our research builds on recent work by Fisman and Hubbard (2002). Like Fisman
and Hubbard, we assume donors wish to maximize the efficiency with which charitable
goods are delivered over time. To do this, donors choose an endowment size that
maximizes (1) the benefits of endowment funds as a buffer to smooth production of the
charitable good, net of (2) the agency costs of endowment funds, which include delays in
the provision of the charitable good to beneficiaries and the potential for managers to
divert assets for their private benefit.
In contrast to Fisman and Hubbard’s (2002) emphasis on modeling expected
endowments, our focus is on examining the consequences of excess endowments, and
whether they are associated with agency problems. This approach is similar to that of
Harford (1999) and Opler et al. (1999), who recognize that the target level of cash
holdings is expected to vary cross-sectionally in for-profit firms, but that deviations from
target levels do sometimes exist and can be associated with agency problems. Our
findings are consistent with the for-profit literature that documents agency problems in
firms with excess cash holdings. However, unlike the for-profit literature, we find no

4

evidence that managers use excess endowments to increase investment. Instead, excess
endowments are highly persistent over time, much more so than in for-profit firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we offer
background on NFPs and review the related literature. We define our hypotheses in
Section 3. We describe our data and research design in Section 4, and present the results
of our tests in Section 5. We provide sensitivity tests of our results in Section 6. In
Section 7, we provide a summary and concluding remarks.
2.

Background on charitable not-for-profits and literature review
The defining feature of not-for-profit organizations is not that they cannot make

profits – in fact, many do – it is that they are prohibited from distributing their profits to
anyone who exercises control over the firm (Hansmann, 1980, 1996). This “nondistribution constraint” means that no parties have a claim to a NFP’s residual earnings.
Consequently, NFPs have no shareholders and cannot issue equity.
However, “instead of issuing shares, NFPs can raise ‘equity’” through
contributions from donors (Gentry, 2002, p. 847). Analogous to cash and marketable
securities in a for-profit firm, the endowment consists of past donations, past profits, and
other capital that has been accumulated, but not expended, in the NFP’s operations.
Thus, similar to a shareholder in a for-profit firm, a donor provides equity capital, but
unlike the shareholder, the donor has no ability to require the return of that capital if cash
balances grow too large. Further, because the endowment comes from current and past
donors, it would be difficult for the NFP to return donations even if it so desired. Finally,
adverse tax consequences to the donors likely render any return of cash to donors
undesirable.

5

The fact that NFPs have no residual claimants does not imply that these
organizations are without effective monitors. Donors, particularly those making large
contributions, often have control rights over the firms even though they do not have
residual claims. For example, large donors often sit on NFP boards (Fama and Jensen,
1983). The fact that large donors have chosen to invest their private capital in a particular
NFP also suggests that these benefactors have a stake in effectively carrying out the
NFP’s mission.
Hansmann (1990), in a discussion of university endowments, examines a number
of reasons why a NFP may accumulate endowment assets.

One reason offered is

precautionary savings – the endowment assets provide a “financial buffer” (p. 39) against
periods of financial adversity, and allow the firm to maintain a constant level of services
in the face of fluctuating expenses and income from donations and other sources. This
precautionary savings explanation is similar to the theory in the for-profit literature to
explain corporate cash holdings (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984; Harford, 1999; Opler et
al., 1999).
Fisman and Hubbard (2002) formalize a model of optimal endowment size where
firms trade off the benefits of precautionary savings as a buffer to smooth production
against the agency costs of endowment funds. They predict and find that donors allow
firms to hold larger endowments when their operating environment is characterized by
highly uncertain cash flows, limited alternative sources of financing, and large fixed
costs. These determinants are analogous to the for-profit literature on corporate cash
holdings (Harford, 1999; Opler et al., 1999), where firms bear costs when they
experience a shortage of funds necessary to carry out their operating and investing

6

activities. As discussed below, we use the Fisman and Hubbard (2002) model to estimate
expected endowment levels in NFPs.
3.

Hypothesis development
Holding aside temporary shocks to donations or revenues, there are three reasons

that an NFP can hold an endowment that is larger than predicted by the Fisman and
Hubbard model. First, the Fisman and Hubbard model does not control for growth
options, and it can be optimal for an NFP to build a large endowment to fund anticipated
growth. For example, before constructing a building, an NFP may save for a portion of
the cost in its endowment. A second reason that a firm can hold an excess endowment is
because of firm-specific advantages in monitoring management’s use of endowment
funds. Fisman and Hubbard predict that when monitoring quality is high, donors may
allow NFP managers to hold larger than normal endowments because the donors are less
concerned about the agency costs of excess endowments. On the other hand, high
monitoring quality may indicate that donors are able to prevent managers from holding
excess endowments (Opler et al. 1999, p. 12). A third reason for excess endowments is
agency problems.
We expect that when donors are active and efficient monitors, NFP endowments
are optimal, on average. However, similar to the arguments made by Harford (1999) and
Opler et al. (1999) about cash holdings in the for-profit literature and by Hansmann
(1990) in the NFP literature, we predict that managers attempt to increase the endowment
beyond the optimal level so as to increase their scope for discretion. Further, consistent
with Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer’s (1994) findings on firms experiencing
cash flow windfalls, we note that a positive exogenous shock to cash flows or asset value

7

can also increase the endowment and, in turn, increase managers’ scope for discretion.
Thus, excess endowments can signal the existence of agency problems.4
Managers of NFPs have four primary options when faced with excess endowment
assets: (1) continue to hold the excess endowment assets; (2) invest in fixed assets that
expand the production capacity of the firm; (3) increase program expenditures; or (4)
consume assets for their private benefit in the form of excess compensation or
perquisites. We examine how managers use excess assets and provide evidence on
whether the excess assets are the consequence of growth options or better monitoring, or
if they instead reflect agency problems.
If excess endowments primarily occur because of anticipated growth
opportunities, we do not expect excess endowments to be persistent. To provide evidence
on whether excess endowments are associated with growth opportunities, we examine
whether firms with excess endowments increase program expenses at a faster rate and
make greater investments in fixed assets than firms with smaller endowments. When
managers increase program expenses, it is clear that they act in donors’ interests. Growth
in fixed assets is more ambiguous, since managers may invest optimally to expand the
scope of the programs they offer, or they may over-invest as a means of increasing
perquisite consumption.

We will interpret increases in both program expenses and

investment as evidence of realized growth options. On the other hand, if we find that
excess endowments are persistent, and that firms with persistent excess endowments do
4

Although our maintained assumption is that donors seek to maximize the efficiency of charitable services,
it is important to note that not all donors will have this preference. Some donors may wish to use the charity
as a vehicle for their own private consumption, and may as a result prefer a build-up of endowment assets.
(Analogously in a public firm, one can imagine that a large shareholder, because of induced risk aversion,
could prefer that the firm maintain large cash holdings.) For example, some donors may contribute assets
and restrict their use so that the donor's name may be prominently displayed by the NFP for a long period
of time. To address this possibility, we examine unrestricted endowment assets in sensitivity tests below.
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not invest nor increase program expenses, this suggests that growth opportunities are not
the reason for excess endowments. In this case, larger than usual endowments suggest
either better than usual monitoring or the existence of agency problems.
To distinguish between better monitoring and agency problems, we examine the
relation between excess endowments and firm efficiency. Our proxy for firm efficiency is
program expenses as a fraction of total expenses (the sum of program, fundraising, and
administrative expenses). This program expense ratio measures the efficiency with which
total expenses are made toward production of the charitable good (programs) instead of
being used for fundraising and administration. The program expense ratio is a widely
used measure of efficiency in NFPs (e.g., Weisbrod and Dominguez, 1986; Posnett and
Sandler, 1989; Tinkelman, 1998 and 1999; Baber, Daniel and Roberts, 2002; Krishnan,
Yetman and Yetman, 2004), and has been used in prior studies examining the relation
between governance quality and NFP performance (e.g., Callen, Klein, and Tinkelman,
2003; Desai and Yetman, 2005). If excess endowments signal better monitoring, we
expect a positive, or no, relation between excess endowments and the program expense
ratio. This follows because better monitoring should prevent potential inefficiencies that
might otherwise result from holding large endowments. On the other hand, a finding of a
negative relation between excess endowment assets and the program expense ratio is
inconsistent with better monitoring, and suggests greater agency problems. We test the
following hypothesis stated in null form:
H1:

The ratio of program expenses to total expenses is unrelated to firms’
excess endowment assets, ceteris paribus.

If we find that firms with excess endowments operate less efficiently, it is
interesting to consider how managers benefit from these agency problems. We expect

9

that if excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems, managers will
either shirk or consume assets for their private benefit in the form of excess compensation
or perquisites. Fisman and Hubbard (2002, p.8) allude to these types of endowmentrelated agency problems by their assumption “that it is easier for managers to pursue
personal interests with endowment funds rather than streams of revenue.” With respect to
compensation, we test the following hypothesis, again stated in null form:
H2:

Managerial compensation is unrelated to firms’ excess endowment assets,
ceteris paribus.

In addition to testing for a relation between agency problems and managerial
compensation, it would be interesting to examine the relation between agency problems
and managerial perquisite consumption. As described below, our compensation measure
does include monetary values for perquisites such as the personal use of housing or
automobiles. However, we do not have data on perquisites such as a light workload and
increased job security. Because we are conducting our study within NFP firms, we expect
that even though these managers may receive lower pay than at similar for-profit firms,
their direct pay including tangible perquisites is an important part of their compensation
and may contain evidence about agency problems.
4.

Sample selection and data description
We use a sample of charitable not-for-profit organizations (also known as

501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations). Although these firms are tax-exempt, they must file
an annual Form 990 with the IRS, and we use data from these returns. A database of NFP
filings is provided by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) through the
Statistics of Income (SOI) files of the IRS for the years 1982 to 2001. We restrict our
attention to the years beginning in 1992 when CEO compensation became available.
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These data contain all 501(c)(3) organizations with more than $10 million in assets plus a
random sample of about 4,000 smaller organizations. Our beginning sample consists of
124,752 firm-year organizations from 1992 to 2001. We exclude grant-making
foundations, mutual organizations, and organizations whose industry is “unknown”
(classified as ‘T’, ‘Y’, and ‘Z’ respectively by the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities
(NTEE) industry classification system).
We delete observations with apparent coding errors: those that report negative
values of total contributions, total revenues, program expenses, total expenses,
investment securities, total assets, total liabilities and top officer compensation. We also
exclude observations that do not have the four prior years of data that we need to
compute volatility of total revenue (a control in the endowment model described in the
next section). This restriction reduces the sample size to 91,140 observations. From this
sample, we match 49,556 firm-year observations with available CEO compensation data.
The CEO compensation data is not available from the NCCS for all firms, and the
reduction in our sample size is similar to the reduction in Fisman and Hubbard (2002)
and Hallock (2002). Finally, we delete 7,804 firm-year observations that report CEO
compensation, but not compensation for all officers as a group, since this is a logical
inconsistency and apparent data error. The final sample used to estimate the endowment
model shown in Equation (1) below consists of 41,752 firm-year observations from 8,727
different organizations.
Table 1 presents the distribution of observations for the four major industries
according to the NTEE industry classification. As in Fisman and Hubbard (2002) and in
Hallock (2002), our sample is concentrated in Health (35.6%) and Education (26.1%).
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The table presents median values for endowment as a multiple of total expenses. This
measure can be interpreted as the number of years that the organization would be able to
fund its expenses without additional revenues. Median endowment scaled by expenses
ranges from a low of 0.24 for ‘Health’ firms up to 1.34 for ‘Arts’ firms. In contrast,
existing research documents much smaller cash holdings in for-profit firms. For example,
Opler et al. (1999) report median cash holdings scaled by non-cash assets of 0.065 across
their sample of for-profit firms, which is much smaller than the median endowment
scaled by non-endowment assets of 0.47 in our sample (untabulated).
The remaining columns present median data on total revenues, total expenses,
investment growth, program expense growth, program expenses, CEO compensation, and
officer and director compensation. Median investment growth (program expense growth)
ranges from 4% (4%) of total expenses in the ‘Arts’ industry to 7% (5%) in the
‘Education’ industry. Median program expenses as a fraction of total expenses is the
smallest in the ‘Arts’ industry at 75.64% and the largest in the ‘Human Services’ industry
at 86.39%. Median CEO compensation ranges from a high of $215,520 in the ‘Health’
industry to a low of $104,140 in the ‘Human Services’ industry. These across-industry
differences emphasize the importance of controlling for industry variation in
endowments, program expenses, and compensation.

Finally, the table also presents

descriptive statistics for the total sample.
Insert Table 1 here
5.

Methodology and results

5.1.

Expectation model for endowment size
We estimate a benchmark model for endowment that follows Fisman and
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Hubbard (2002) and is analogous to the model estimated for public firms by Opler et al.
(1999). We expect endowments to be larger in firms with more uncertain cash flows, in
smaller firms, and in firms with limited alternative sources of financing.
Consistent with Fisman and Hubbard, we model the ratio of endowment to total
expenses. We measure endowment (Endow/Exp) as the sum of cash, savings, and
investment securities (line 45, column (b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, column (b))
deflated by total expenses (line 17).5 Because we are interested in the potential agency
costs of excess liquid assets, and to be consistent with the for-profit literature on agency
costs of excess cash holdings, we exclude less liquid assets such as inventory, land,
buildings, and equipment.
Firms with uncertain cash flows require a greater buffer of precautionary funds.
We proxy for cash flow uncertainty using the coefficient of variation of total revenue
(CVREV) (line 12). CVREV is the ratio of the standard deviation of total revenue to mean
total revenue, both measured over the five years ending at year t. We require at least four
annual observations of total revenues prior to year t for our computation, and if less
historical data are available, we delete the observation.
Firms with alternative financing sources require less precautionary funds. We
proxy for access to financing sources using an Access to Debt variable coded ‘1’ if the
firm has obtained debt in the last ten years ending at year t, and ‘0’ otherwise. We
categorize a firm as having debt if the firm reports tax-exempt bond liabilities (line 64a,
column (b)) or mortgages and other notes payable (line 64b, column (b)). Following
Fisman and Hubbard, we also interact the Access to Debt variable with CVREV with the

5

Line numbers refer to lines on the IRS Form 990.
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expectation that cash flow uncertainty requires a smaller buffer of funds when firms have
access to alternative financing sources.
We control for variation in monitoring across states using state fixed effects in the
model. These indicator variables also control for state-specific differences in donor
income and firm growth opportunities. Fisman and Hubbard (2002) proxy for monitoring
with an index of state regulatory oversight, and Desai and Yetman (2005) proxy for
monitoring with indices of state-level legal and reporting requirements. Because these
indices of regulation, legal and reporting requirements are count variables of state level
attributes, they can be expressed as linear combinations of state indicator variables.
Accordingly, our state indicators capture the same variation in monitoring as these other
indices.6
Firms with more cash inflows may temporarily hold more cash, and larger firms
need less precautionary savings (Opler et al., 1999). We control for these size effects
using the natural logarithm of total revenue (line 12). In addition to state effects, we also
control for industry and year fixed effects in the model. The industry (year) effects
control for industry-specific (year-specific) differences in donor income, regulation and
monitoring, and firm growth opportunities. The benchmark endowment regression is:
Endow/Expit = β0 + β1*CVREVit + β2*LogRevenueit + β3*Access to Debtit
+ β4*(Access to Debtit)* CVREVit + Σ β j * State j + Σ β m * Industry m + εit. (1)
We winsorize all variables by year at the 1% and 99% levels (i.e., for each
variable we re-assign its value if it is less (greater) than the 1st (99th) percentile to the
value of the 1st (99th) percentile in a given year) to mitigate the influence of outliers.

6

Because the state indicators capture differences across states in monitoring, as well as differences in
income, growth, and other factors, they cannot be directly interpreted as monitoring effects as the indices
can; however, this interpretation is not a focus for our study.
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Table 2 – Column I presents the results of the expectation model for endowments
described by Equation (1). Year, state, and industry dummies are included in the
regression models but are not tabulated. In all regression specifications, we use HuberWhite robust standard errors clustered by firm. These standard errors are a generalization
of the White (1980) standard errors and are robust to both serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity (Rogers, 1993). All explanatory variables are statistically significant in
the predicted direction. The total explanatory power of the model (R-square of 23.7%) is
comparable to R-squares ranging from 23% to 24% in Fishman and Hubbard’s (2002)
Table 4. The results support the precautionary savings theory of endowment, in which
firms with more volatile cash flows accumulate larger endowments, and large firms and
firms with access to debt have lower endowment levels. Finally, we find that the
interaction between the Access to Debt and CVREV is negative and significant, consistent
with the hypothesis that access to finance alleviates the necessity to accumulate
endowment in order to self-protect from cash-flow volatility.7
Because variable costs can be cut quickly in the event of financial distress,
Fisman and Hubbard also predict that endowments are smaller for firms with a greater
proportion of variable costs. To proxy for lower variable costs within the organization,
they compute a labor intensity variable, and predict a negative association between this
variable and endowment. We do not include this variable in our primary model because
one of our hypotheses predicts that excess endowments are associated with
compensation-related agency problems, and total wages is potentially a measure of

7

A concern with the Access to Debt variable is that it may be endogenous to endowments, i.e., a larger
endowment makes it easier to obtain debt. To address this concern, we remove the Access to Debt variable,
and estimate the remainder of the endowment model as a reduced form. If we use this model for
computing abnormal endowment, all of our results below in Tables 3 to 8 are qualitatively the same.
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agency problems (Bertrand and Mullanaithan, 2003). However, for comparison with
Fisman and Hubbard, in Column II we tabulate the endowment model including labor
intensity (LABOR%), measured as total compensation for all employees including
salaries, pension plan contributions, benefits and taxes (lines 25 + 26 + 27 + 28 + 29,
column (a)). We express this variable as a percentage of total expenses (line 17). As
expected, LABOR% is negatively related to endowment. The estimated coefficients for
the remaining variables are very similar to the ones reported in Column I, and have the
expected sign. In sensitivity tests, we find that none of our inferences are affected if
instead we use the model in Column II to obtain our estimates of excess endowments.
We consider the regression in Table 2 - Column I to be a reasonable expectations
model for the benchmark endowment held by a firm. We estimate a firm’s excess
endowment as the residual from yearly regressions using this model. That is, a firm with
a positive (negative) residual in a given year is assumed to hold more (less) endowment
than the benchmark level. As discussed above, a residual endowment can mean: (1) an
endowment that is optimally larger because of firm-specific growth opportunities; (2) an
endowment that is optimally larger because firm-specific monitoring is better; or (3) an
endowment that is sub-optimally larger that can indicate firm-specific agency problems.
Our empirical tests in the next two sections are designed to distinguish these alternatives.
Insert Table 2 here
5.2

The association between excess endowments and growth opportunities
To examine whether excess endowments are associated with growth

opportunities, we follow Opler et al. (1999) and examine the persistence of excess
endowments over time. We divide our sample firms into quartiles based on excess
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endowment every year. We then track the firms over the next five years to determine
which excess endowment quartile the firm belongs to in the subsequent years.
In Table 3, we present the persistence of excess endowment for firms selected
based on the first time they enter the highest quartile of excess endowment. We find that
74.7% of the high endowment firms remain in the top quartile of excess endowment in
the following year, and 62.2% of the high endowment firms remain in the top quartile
group five years later. The persistence of excess endowment is substantially higher than
the persistence of excess cash holdings documented in for-profit firms by Opler et al.
(1999), who find that only 39% of the for-profit firms remain in the top quartile group
five years later.
Insert Table 3 here
The results in Table 3 are not consistent with the explanation that excess
endowments are built up in anticipation of growth opportunities. To further investigate
whether excess endowments are associated with growth opportunities, we examine
growth in investment and growth in program expenses over one- and two-year periods
following the measurement of excess endowment. We measure investments in property,
plant, and equipment (PPE GR) as the change in land, buildings, and equipment (line
57a, column (b)) plus depreciation (line 42, column (a)). PROGRAM GR is the change in
program services expenses (line 13). We compute PPE GR and PROGRAM GR for both
one year (from year t-1 to t) and two years (from t-1 to t+1). To compare the growth
across firms, we divide each measure by total expenses (line 17) at year t-1, and multiply
it by 100 to express it as a percentage of total expenses.
To examine the relation between excess endowment and growth, we use
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regression models of the following form:
(Dependent Variablen)it = β0 + β1*Log Expenses it-1 + β2* Q4 Ex Endowit-1 +
Σ β t * Year t + Σ β j * State j + Σ β m * Industry m + εit.

(2)

where Dependent Variablen represents either PPE GR% or PROGRAM GR%. Q4 Ex
Endowit-1 is an indicator variable that indicates an excess endowment: It is coded as ‘1’ if
the excess endowment is in the top quartile of the distribution in the year it is measured,
and ‘0’ otherwise. We control for firm size using Log Expensesit-1, the natural logarithm
of prior-year total expenses (line 17). We also control for year, state, and industry fixed
effects in the model.
The first (fourth) column of Table 4 shows the results of estimating Equation (2)
with one-year PPE GR% (one-year PROGRAM GR%) as the dependent variable. In each
case, the regression indicates that firms with endowments in the upper quartile invest
about 2% of expenses more in new PPE and add about 2% more in new program
expenses than do the remaining three quartiles of firms with smaller endowments.
To explore whether this extra investment is attributable to firms with transitory
excess endowments, we partition firms into a persistent excess endowment group
(Persistent Ex Endowt-1) and a transitory excess endowment group (Transitory Ex
Endowt-1). We code an excess endowment as persistent if it remains in the top quartile of
the distribution two years ahead, and transitory otherwise. The second and fifth columns
of Table 4 show the results of estimating regressions for one-year PPE GR% and oneyear PROGRAM GR% respectively, that distinguish between persistent and transitory
endowments. The number of observations is smaller in these regressions because of the
requirement that we observe endowment at t+1. Consistent with a build-up and
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subsequent liquidation of endowments to fund growth, firms with transitory endowments
show significantly greater one-year growth in investments and program expenses. The
third and sixth columns show that these firms exhibit significantly greater two-year
growth as well.
In contrast, firms with persistent excess endowments do not show substantial
growth in investment or program. Two-year growth rates are not significantly different
from zero. Although there is a significant one-year growth rates in program expenses
firms with persistent excess endowments, its magnitude of 0.69% is economically small.
Insert Table 4 here
To summarize this section, we find that for most firms with excess endowments,
the excess endowments are persistent. Firms with persistent excess endowments do not
invest more nor increase program expenses. This evidence suggests that growth
opportunities are not the reason for excess endowments for most firms. For these firms,
large endowments suggest either better monitoring or agency problems.
5.3

Tests to discriminate between better monitoring and agency problems
To distinguish between better monitoring and agency problems, we conduct tests

of Hypotheses 1 and 2 that examine the relation between excess endowments and both
program expenses and executive compensation. To test Hypothesis 1, we measure the
program expense ratio, PROG EXP RATIO, as total program services expenses (line 13)
as a percentage of total expenses (line 17). As discussed above, this ratio is widely used
as a measure of efficiency and performance both by donors and by previous researchers.
A high proportion of program expenses to total expenses, which is the same as a low
proportion of management, general and fundraising expenses to total expenses, means
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that the organization is efficiently delivering services to maximize the charitable good.
To test Hypothesis 2, we construct two measures of managerial compensation.
Our first measure is total CEO compensation, CEO COMP, computed as the natural
logarithm of CEO compensation. This measure includes: (1) “salary, fees, and bonuses”
(Part V, column (c)), (2) contributions to employee benefit plans and deferred
compensation (Part V, column (d)), and (3) expense account and other8 (Part V, column
(e)).9 Second, we compute the fraction of total expenses attributable to the compensation
of top executives. O&D COMP% is officer and director compensation (line 25, column
(a)) as a percentage of total expenses (line 17).
We examine the association between excess endowment and the three dependent
variables using regression models of the following form:
(Dependent Variablen)it = β0 + β1* Controls + β2* Ex Endowit-1
+ Σ β t * Year t + Σ β j * State j + Σ β m * Industry m + εit.

(3)

(Dependent Variablen)it = β0 + β1* Controls + β2* Positive Ex Endowit-1 +
β3* Negative Ex Endow it-1 +
Σ β t * Year t + Σ β j * State j + Σ β m * Industry m + εit.

(4)

(Dependent Variablen)it = β0 + β1* Controls + β2* Q4 Ex Endowit-1 +
Σ β t * Year t + Σ β j * State j + Σ β m * Industry m + εit.

(5)

where Dependent Variablen represents either PROG EXP RATIO, CEO COMP, or O&D
COMP%.
In Model (3), we use a continuous measure of the excess endowment measure, Ex
Endowit-1, which is simply the residual from the benchmark endowment model described

8

As described in the instructions to IRS Form 990, this amount includes expense account reimbursements
and perquisites such as "the value of the personal use of housing, automobiles, or other assets owned or
leased by the organization (or provided for the organization's use without charge), as well as any taxable or
nontaxable fringe benefits)."
9
"Part" positions refer to parts of IRS Form 990.
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by Equation (1). Model (4) is a spline regression with an inflection point at zero. Positive
(Negative) Ex Endowit-1 is Ex Endowit-1 if Ex Endowit-1 is positive (negative or 0), and ‘0’
otherwise. This specification is consistent with Opler et al.’s (1999) capital expenditure
regressions that allow different coefficients on positive and negative excess cash holdings
(see their Table 8, pp. 36-37). In Model (5), we measure excess endowment as an
indicator variable, Q4 Ex Endowit-1, coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment is in the top
quartile of the distribution in the year it is measured, and ‘0’ otherwise. Under the
assumption that we measure excess endowment with error, as compared to a continuous
measure, this variable may allow for a more powerful test of whether agency problems
are more severe in firms with the largest excess endowments. This last approach follows
Opler et al. (1999) who find that capital expenditures and acquisitions are greatest in the
highest quartile of excess cash holdings, and Harford (1999) who examines
characteristics of “cash rich” firms with very large excess cash holdings.
We expect the coefficients on Ex Endowit-1 and Q4 Ex Endowit-1 to be negatively
related to PROG EXP RATIOit if there are agency problems. This follows because firms
with agency problems have lower operating efficiency. We predict that the sign of the
coefficient on Positive Ex Endowit-1 is negative, and the sign of the coefficient on
Negative Ex Endowit-1 is zero. Like Opler et al. (1999), we expect that cash-related
agency problems reside primarily in firms with excess cash holdings.
When CEO COMPit and O&D COMP%it are the dependent variables, we expect
the coefficients on Ex Endowit-1 and Q4 Ex Endowit-1 to be positive if firms with large
excess endowments suffer from agency problems that result in excess managerial
compensation. Based on our expectation that cash-related agency problems reside
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primarily in firms with excess cash holdings, we predict the sign of the coefficient on
Positive Ex Endowit-1 is positive, and the sign of the coefficient on Negative Ex Endowit-1
is zero.
In each model, Controls refers to our control variables for the expected level of
each dependent variable in the absence of agency problems. We expect that firm size,
industry membership, and location are important determinants of all of the dependent
variables. We control for firm size using Log Expensesit-1, the natural logarithm of prioryear total expenses (line 17). As above, we control for variation in monitoring across
states using state fixed effects in the model. These indicator variables also help control
for state-specific differences in donor income and firm growth opportunities. We also
include industry effects in all models to help control for industry-specific differences in
income, regulation and monitoring, and firm growth opportunities. Finally, we include
year indicators in the regression to control for differences over time.
In addition, in the program expense ratio regressions, we include controls for
potential manipulation of program expense accounting. Krishnan et al. (2004) present
evidence consistent with charities overstating program expenses to appear more efficient,
and with weaker charities engaging in more of this manipulation. A potential concern
with our tests is that a negative relation between excess endowments and program
expenses could reflect upward manipulation by under-endowed firms (weaker firms)
rather than inefficiency by over-endowed firms. To address this concern, we include as
controls the two variables Krishnan et al. show to be associated with manipulation: (1)
Contributions%it-1 (the ratio of total contributions (line 1d) to total revenue (line 12)), and
(2) Liabilitiesit-1 (total liabilities (line 66) divided by total assets (line 59)). Total
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contributions includes both private donations from individuals and corporate, and
government grants.
In the compensation regressions, we include a control for performance. Hallock
(2002) finds that outside fundraising is the performance measure that best explains CEO
compensation in NFPs. Thus, in the CEO COMPit and O&D COMP%it regressions, we
follow Hallock (2002) and use the logarithm of total contributions (line 1d) in the current
year to control for outside fundraising in addition to our controls for size, industry, year,
and state effects.10 To avoid losing 4,508 observations due to taking the logarithm of
zero, we include an indicator variable, Zero Contributionsit, equal to 1 if outside
fundraising is zero, and 0 otherwise. We then measure Log Contributionsit as the log of
total contributions if positive, and 0 otherwise. In sensitivity tests, we also include an
additional control for growth opportunities in our pay regressions by including the oneyear-ahead realized percentage change in program expenditures.
All variables in Equations (3), (4) and (5) are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
levels to mitigate the influence of outliers.
5.4

The association between excess endowments and the program expense ratio
In Table 5, we test Hypothesis 1 and present results from OLS regressions of

PROG EXP RATIO on proxies for excess endowment and control variables. As described
in Section 5.3, we tabulate three model specifications with different variables and
functional forms for excess endowment. Fiscal year, state, and industry dummies are
included in the regression models but are not tabulated. As above, in all regression

10

In unreported tests, we include change in net income (either scaled by sales or assets) as an additional
performance measure. Consistent with Hallock (2002), we find that this measure has no significant positive
association with pay, and does not affect the inference from our excess endowment variables.
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specifications, we use Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm. These
standard errors are a generalization of the White (1980) standard errors and are robust to
both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (Rogers, 1993).
In Table 5, PROG EXP RATIO is positively correlated with total expenses in all
specifications. Because total expenses are the sum of program expenses, management
expenses, and fundraising expenses, this finding suggests that larger firms are more
efficient in that a larger fraction of each dollar of expenses goes toward program costs.
Consistent with our alternative hypothesis that excess endowments are associated
with agency problems that render NFPs less efficient, we find in Column I that PROG
EXP RATIO is negatively correlated with Ex Endow. This result continues to hold when
we control for the relation between PROG EXP RATIO and negative excess endowments
in Column II. The significant negative relation between PROG EXP RATIO and excess
endowments holds for firms with positive endowments; there is no relation for firms with
negative excess endowments. Finally, in Column III, we find a negative relation between
PROG EXP RATIO and the large endowment indicator variable, Q4 Ex Endow. In terms
of economic significance, firms in the highest quartile of excess endowment have a ratio
of program service expenses to total expenses that is 1.77% smaller than firms in the
bottom three quartiles of excess endowment. For the average firm in the sample, this
ratio would decrease by 2.18% from 81.27% to 79.50%. Overall, the results in Columns I
through III in Table 5 show a negative relation between excess endowment and program
expenses, which supports our alternative hypothesis that excess endowments are
associated with agency problems and lower expenditures on charity.
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As discussed above, in our Table 5 regressions we control for potential incentives
to manipulate using Contributions%it-1 and Liabilitiesit-1. If the dominant effect of
Contributions%it-1 is manipulation, then we expect it to be positively associated with
program expenses. Alternatively, in the absence of manipulation, firms that raise more
contributions will have greater fundraising expense and lower program expense. The
estimated negative coefficient on Contributions%it-1 in Table 5 suggests that this latter
economic effect dominates manipulation in our sample. The estimated positive
coefficient on Liabilitiesit-1 in the Table 5 regressions is consistent with Krishnan et al.'s
hypothesis that firms with greater financial distress engage in more manipulation.
However, we note that although our findings on the relation with excess endowment hold
in the presence of these controls for potential manipulation, they also hold if we remove
these controls or enter them separately in our regressions.
As a second means of addressing the concern that under-endowed firms
manipulate program expenses upward, we divide the sample based on expected
manipulation. We follow Krishnan et al. in defining as clear "manipulators" those firms
with zero fundraising expenses although they receive contributions and have no
permissible reason for not reporting fundraising expenses. We then estimate separate
regressions for the 16,796 "manipulators" and the 24,956 remaining observations. We
find significant negative associations between excess endowment and program expenses
in both subsamples (untabulated). If this relation were spuriously induced by
manipulation, we would not expect to see a relation in either subsample. In addition, our
results for the low-manipulation firms are virtually identical to those shown in Column
III for the full sample. Overall, we find no evidence that the negative relation between
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excess endowments and program expenses is induced by manipulation; instead, the
relation appears to reflect agency problems.
As discussed above, an accumulation of excess endowment funds may indicate
that the firm anticipates growth opportunities. Firms with growth opportunities could
have higher fundraising expenses and lower program expenses, and for these firms, we
could observe a negative association between excess endowments and program expenses
for reasons unrelated to agency problems. Although our results above suggest growth
opportunities are not the reason for excess endowment for most firms, it is conceivable
that our finding of a negative relation between excess endowment and efficiency could be
driven by the minority of excess endowment firms that show substantial growth. To
address this concern, in Table 5 – Column VI, we divide firms with excess endowment
into those with Transitory Ex Endow and Persistent Ex Endow. As described above, these
variables require data on one-year-ahead endowment. This requirement reduces the
sample size to 32,949 observations and is the reason we do not include these variables in
the main tests. As shown in Column VI, we find that both Persistent Ex Endow and
Transitory Ex Endow are associated with lower PROG EXP RATIO, confirming that our
results hold within the subsample of firms that is not characterized by growth
opportunities.11
Insert Table 5 here
5.5

The Association between Excess Endowments and Compensation
In Tables 6 and 7, we test Hypothesis 2 and present results from OLS regressions

of the compensation variables on proxies for excess endowment and control variables.

11

If we also include the one-year-ahead realized percentage change in program expenses as an additional
proxy for growth opportunities, the inference is the same.
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Table 6 first examines the relation between excess endowments and CEO compensation,
CEO COMP.
Consistent with Hallock (2002), we find in all specifications that CEO COMP is
positively associated with contributions and with our size proxy, total expenses.12 We
also find a positive coefficient on Zero Contributions. The magnitude of the coefficient
on Zero Contributions indicates that CEOs who raise no contributions earn about the
same compensation as CEOs who raise an average amount of funds.13
As in Table 5, we again use multiple measures of excess endowment in our
Tables 6 and 7 regressions. In Column I, we use a continuous excess endowment
variable (Ex Endow) as a proxy for the presence of agency problems. Consistent with our
prediction in Hypothesis 2, CEO COMP exhibits a positive association with excess
endowment, and is significant at a 10% level. The coefficient indicates that compensation
increases by 3.6% when excess endowment increases by one standard deviation. Column
II presents the results with the continuous excess endowment variable separately for firms
with positive and negative excess endowments. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the
estimated coefficient for excess endowment is positive and statistically significant for
positive endowment firms. Also consistent with our predictions, and the intuition in Opler
et al. (1999), we find no significant relation between excess endowment and CEO
compensation for negative endowment firms. Column III shows that the significant
positive relation between excess endowments and CEO COMP is robust to using Q4 Ex
12

Hallock uses total assets as a size proxy, but this variable is confounded in our tests by the fact that total
assets are larger when endowments are larger. We obtain very similar results if we use the logarithm of
“normal” assets (assets less abnormal endowment) instead of expenses in the regression model.
13
The coefficient on Zero Contributions is 0.36, which is similar to the 0.37 compensation effect for CEOs
with average contributions. (0.37 is equal to the product of the 0.03 coefficient on Log Contributions and
the 12.47 average log contribution). One explanation for this finding is that the CEOs who raise no funds
manage firms in which contributions are not important and therefore not used as a performance measure.
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Endow as a proxy for large excess endowments (coded as ‘1’ for firms in the top quartile
of excess endowment in a given year). In terms of economic significance, firms in the
highest quartile of excess endowment pay their CEOs approximately 8% more than firms
in the bottom three quartiles. 14
An alternative explanation for our finding that CEO compensation and excess
endowment are positively correlated is that large endowments proxy for management
quality, and higher quality managers receive more pay. Two major types of management
quality are ability to manage growth opportunities and efficiency, either in fundraising or
in managing the NFP. Our results above show that firms with excess endowments are less
efficient, so the data do not support the conjecture that high-endowment managers are
more efficient. Our results above also indicate growth opportunities are not the reason for
excess endowments for most firms. However, it is conceivable that the positive relation
between CEO compensation and excess endowment is driven by the minority of firms
that do show substantial growth and who require higher quality executives to carry out
this growth. To address this concern, in Column IV, we again divide firms with excess
endowment into those with Transitory Ex Endow and Persistent Ex Endow. As described
above, this requirement reduces the sample size to 32,763 observations. As shown in
Column IV, we find that both Persistent Ex Endow and Transitory Ex Endow are
associated with higher CEO compensation, confirming that our results hold within the
subsample of firms that is not characterized by growth opportunities.15

14

If we substitute the program expense ratio for excess endowment in the compensation regression, we find
that firms with a higher program ratio pay lower compensation. This negative association is consistent with
agency problems being manifested by low program expense ratios and high compensation.
15
If we also include the one-year-ahead realized percentage change in program expenses as an additional
proxy for growth opportunities, the inference is the same.
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Insert Table 6 here
Table 7 presents results with O&D COMP% as a proxy for agency costs. Our
controls for size and performance are significant and of the predicted sign.16 Consistent
with Hypothesis 2, the results in Column I show that O&D COMP% is positively related
to Ex Endow. Column II shows that there is a significant positive association between
compensation and Ex Endow when there is an excess of endowment, and an unexpected
negative association when there is a deficit of endowment. One interpretation of this
negative relation for low endowments is that firms with extremely low endowments
require executives that are highly skilled in fundraising, and that it requires more effort
and talent to run an under-endowed institution. A second interpretation is that firms with
very small endowments are near distress, and compensation is higher to reflect additional
termination risk.
Column III shows a positive relation between O&D COMP% and the indicator
variable for large excess endowments, implying that officers and directors of firms in the
top quartile of excess endowment receive higher pay. In terms of economic significance,
firms in the extreme quartile of excess endowment have a 0.40% greater ratio of officer
and director compensation to expenses compared to the firms in the bottom three
quartiles. An increase of 0.40% in the officer and director pay ratio implies a 14% rise in
the average O&D COMP% of 2.89%.
Finally, in Column IV, we divide firms with excess endowment into those with

16

Note our finding that larger firms pay less officer and director compensation as a percentage of expenses
is consistent with our results in Table 6, which show a coefficient of 0.30 when log(compensation) is
regressed on log(size). This means that compensation increases at a decreasing rate with firm size, which
implies that pay as a fraction of expenses decreases as expenses increase. Regression analysis (not
tabulated) shows that we obtain the same inference if we instead use log of O&D compensation as a
dependent variable.
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Transitory Ex Endow and Persistent Ex Endow in order to assure that our results are not
driven by firms with substantial growth. We find that both Persistent Ex Endow and
Transitory Ex Endow are associated with higher O&D COMP%, indicating that our
results hold for the substantial majority of firms that are not using endowment to finance
growth, and reinforcing our hypothesis that excess endowments are associated with
agency problems.17
Insert Table 7 here
In summary, the results in Tables 6 and 7 show a positive relation between excess
endowment and both CEO as well officer and director compensation. These findings
corroborate our findings in Table 5 that excess endowments are associated with agency
problems.
6.

Robustness tests
Our measure of endowment assumes that all of the funds in the endowment are

equally accessible to management and equally give rise to potential agency problems. In
fact, many NFPs have endowments with assets that are restricted to specific uses by
donors, such as certain capital projects or serving the needs of specific clientele (e.g.,
scholarships for low-income students). Restricted assets may limit the discretion of
management with respect to these funds, thereby lowering potential agency problems. In
addition, donors may put restrictions on assets in settings where agency problems are
known to be large. On the other hand, restrictions can impede the efficient functioning of
the charity. For example, if restrictions are too tight, these assets are not useful as
precautionary savings, and total endowment holdings must be greater as a result.

17

If we also include the one-year-ahead realized percentage change in program expenses as an additional
proxy for growth opportunities, the inference is the same.
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Although we have no clear prediction on the relation between restricted assets and
agency problems, we re-estimate our measure of excess endowments from Table 2 and
our regressions in the Column III of Tables 5, 6, and 7 after eliminating the portion of
endowment assets that is restricted. We compute Unrestricted_Endow as unrestricted
assets (line 67) deflated by total expenses (line 17). These data come from a separate
NCCS "digitized" database that contains more detail from Form 990s but is available
only for the period of 1998 to 2001. This data requirement reduces the sample to 16,381
observations. We report these results in Table 8. On this smaller sample, we find that our
results are qualitatively the same as those shown in Tables 5 to 7: Unrestricted excess
endowment exhibits a significant negative association with program expenses, and
significant positive associations with both CEO compensation and officer and director
compensation. However, the coefficient magnitudes of these associations appear to be
larger than those shown above.
Insert Table 8 here
Our final robustness check considers the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion
of healthcare organizations, which are primarily hospitals and comprise over forty
percent of our sample. As noted by Weisbrod (1988) and Fisman and Hubbard (2002),
healthcare appears to be systematically different from other NFP activities. In particular,
hospitals face for-profit competition and may behave more like for-profit organizations.
Second, hospitals are significant issuers of tax-exempt debt and use the proceeds of these
issuances to increase their endowments (Gentry, 2002). Consistent with the approach in
Fisman and Hubbard (2002), to ensure that our results are not driven by these
organizations, we remove them from the sample and re-estimate our model of excess
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endowments. We then use the residuals from this model to re-run our tests in Tables 5, 6,
and 7. The results for the full sample are qualitatively similar to those reported above for
program expenses and CEO compensation, i.e., firms in the top quartile of excess
endowments have significantly lower program expenses and significantly higher CEO
compensation. The results for officer and director compensation are weaker: the relation
between the top quartile of excess endowment and pay is positive, but not significant.
When we omit health-care organizations from the analysis of unrestricted excess
endowments, however, the results are qualitatively similar to those shown in Table 8:
firms in the top quartile of excess endowments have significantly lower program
expenses and significantly higher CEO compensation and officer and director
compensation.
7.

Conclusion
In this paper, we examine agency problems in NFPs arising from excess holdings

of endowment assets. Previous research explores agency costs of excess cash holdings in
for-profit firms, and although the evidence is somewhat mixed, researchers generally find
that excess cash is associated with excessive acquisitions and investment. Compared to
cash holdings in for-profit firms, NFPs hold substantially greater assets in their
endowments. Further, NFPs do not have obvious residual claimants with a strong interest
and ability to monitor management, and unlike for-profits, it is generally not feasible for
NFPs to return excess assets to donors. However, the ability of NFP managers to extract
rents through acquisitions is also very limited. Although Hansmann (1990) conjectures
the existence of agency problems with excess endowments, and Fisman and Hubbard
(2002) model optimal endowment levels, it is an open and interesting empirical question
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as to whether NFP excess endowment holdings result in agency problems.
Our tests are designed to distinguish between three alternative explanations for
excess endowments: (1) growth opportunities, (2) monitoring, or (3) agency problems.
Inconsistent with large endowments anticipating greater firm-specific growth
opportunities, we find that most firms with excess endowments maintain their excess
endowments for several years, and that firms with persistent excess endowments do not
exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. Inconsistent with better
monitoring, we find that program expenditures toward the charitable good are lower for
firms with excess endowments. We also provide evidence that excess CEO pay and total
officer and director pay are greater for firms with excess endowments. Overall, we find
that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems.
Corporate governance and executive compensation in NFPs has come under
intense scrutiny in recent years, and there is increasing concern about these issues among
regulators. For example, in his June 22, 2004 testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on
Finance, Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, stated:
The issues of governance and executive compensation are closely intertwined.
We are concerned that the governing boards of tax-exempt organizations are not,
in all cases, exercising sufficient diligence as they set compensation for the
leadership of the organizations. There have been numerous recent reports of
executives of both private foundations and public charities who are receiving
unreasonably large compensation packages.
Beginning in the summer of 2004, the IRS undertook an aggressive investigation of
nonprofit governance, as well as the practices nonprofits use to set compensation. Our
finding that excessive executive compensation is more pervasive at NFPs with excess
endowments provides insight into the types of not-for-profit organizations where
governance and executive compensation are less likely to stand up to scrutiny.
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics by Industry

Industry Descriptive
Arts
Education
Health
Human services
Other
Sample Descriptive
Mean
STD
Median

% of Total
Observations

Endow/Exp

Revenue
($ millions)

Expenses
($ millions)

PPE GR%

PROGRAM
GR%

PROG EXP
RATIO

CEO COMP
($ thousands)

O&D
COMP%

6.57
26.10
35.62
13.13
18.58

1.34
1.06
0.24
0.40
0.66

8.36
22.18
59.01
9.66
8.30

6.21
18.80
55.77
9.13
7.09

0.04
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.03

0.04
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05

75.64
83.16
86.38
86.39
83.07

142.39
156.25
215.52
104.14
128.25

3.07
1.59
0.71
1.59
2.65

2.01
4.36
0.49

63.21
121.89
20.67

58.12
114.12
18.21

0.11
0.25
0.05

0.07
0.19
0.05

81.27
14.34
84.41

203.11
174.17
157.50

2.89
4.67
1.36

This table presents median descriptive statistics by industry for a sample of 41,752 not-for-profit firm-year observations. The four major industries follow the
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) industry classification. The table also presents mean, standard deviation and median descriptive statistics for the
total sample. Endow/Exp is the sum of cash, savings, and investment securities (line 45, column (b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, column (b)) deflated by total
expenses (line 17). Revenue is the total revenue (line 12) in millions of dollars. Expenses is the total expenses (line 17) in millions of dollars. PPE GR is the
change in land, buildings, and equipment (line 57a, column (b)) plus depreciation (line 42, column (a)) from year t-1 to t (one year) and from t-1 to t+1 (two
years). We deflate PPE GR by total expenses (line 17) at year t-1, and multiply it by 100 to express it as a percentage of total expenses. PROGRAM GR is the
change in total program services expenses (line 13) from year t-1 to t (one year) and from t-1 to t+1 (two years). We deflate PROGRAM GR by total expenses
(line 17) at year t-1, and multiply it by 100 to express it as a percentage of total expenses. PROG EXP RATIO is total program services expenses (line 13) as a
percentage of total expenses (line 17). CEO COMP is total CEO compensation (Form 990 – Part V, column (c) + column (d) + column (e)) in thousands of
dollars. O&D COMP% is officer and director compensation (line 25, column (a)) as a percentage of total expenses (line 17).
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Table 2 – Determinants of Benchmark Endowment
Variable

Dep. Variable: Endow/Expt

Predicted
Sign

Intercept

I

II

7.34***
(7.98)

9.27***
(10.69)

CVREV t

+

11.56***
(18.86)

10.20***
(17.41)

Log Revenue t

-

-0.41***
(-11.52)

-0.42***
(-12.08)

Access to Debt t

-

-0.49***
(-3.72)

-0.40***
(-3.13)

CVREV *Access to Debt t

-

-6.75***
(-10.08)

-6.35***
(-9.82)

LABOR% t

-

-4.55***
(-14.67)

R-square (%)
Observations

23.71
41,752

26.61
41,752

This table presents the results of an OLS model of the determinants of benchmark endowment. Endow/Exp is
the sum of cash, savings, and investment securities (line 45, column (b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, column
(b)) deflated by total expenses (line 17). CVREV is the coefficient of variation of total revenue (line 12)
measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of total revenue to mean total revenue, both measured in the last
five years ending at year t. We delete observations with less than four years of data (among the last five years)
available to compute the coefficient of variation of total revenues. Log Revenue is the natural logarithm of total
revenue (line 12). Access to Debt is an indicator variable coded ‘1’ if the firm in year t has obtained debt in the
last ten years ending at year t. We categorize a firm as having debt if it has tax-exempt bond liabilities (line 64a,
column (b)) or mortgages and other notes payable (line 64b, column (b)). LABOR% is the total compensation
for all employees including salaries, pension plan contributions, benefits and taxes (lines 25 + 26 + 27 + 28 +
29, column (a)) as a percentage of total expenses (line 17). Industry, state, and year dummies are included in the
model but not tabulated in the results. T-statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1
percent levels.
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Table 3 – Persistence of Excess Endowment
Time since firm
enters top quartile of
excess endowment

Percentage of firms in quartile of excess endowment
Quartile 1

Quartile 2

Quartile 3

Year 0

Quartile 4

3,034
100.0%

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

59

80

428

1,678

2.6%

3.6%

19.1%

74.7%

85

101

378

1,226

4.8%

5.6%

21.1%

68.5%

92

87

320

932

6.4%

6.1%

22.4%

65.2%

72

85

258

764

6.1%

7.2%

21.9%

64.8%

69

74

206

574

7.5%

8.0%

22.3%

62.2%

This table examines the persistence of excess endowment for firms in the highest excess endowment quartile.
Firms are ranked into quartiles every year based on the excess level of endowment (Ex Endow) at year t. Ex
Endow is the residual from the determinants of benchmark endowment regression (Table 2), where endowment
is the sum of cash, savings, and investment securities (line 45, column (b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54,
column (b)) deflated by total expenses (line 17). Firms are selected based on the first time they enter the highest
quartile of excess endowment. The firms are followed for the next five years to determine the quartile in which
they belong in the subsequent years. Quartile 4 represents the highest excess endowment quartile, and Year 0 is
the starting measurement year. The number of firm years in each quartile, each year, is presented and the
percentage of firms is in italics.
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Table 4 – Determinants of Investment and Growth in Program Expenses
Variable

Intercept

Log Expensest-1

Q4 Ex Endow t-1

Dep. Variable: PPE GR%

Dep. Variable: PROGRAM GR%

1-Year

1-Year

2-Year

1-Year

1-Year

2-Year

15.46***

14.50***

40.33***

24.27***

25.51***

47.35***

(3.21)

(3.73)

(3.93)

(12.39)

(11.93)

(12.13)

-0.30**

-0.40***

-1.16***

-1.23***

-1.36***

-2.42***

(-2.26)

(-2.69)

(-3.57)

(-14.60)

(-13.92)

(-13.78)

1.58***

2.24***

(3.74)

(8.88)

Persistent Ex Endow t-1

Transitory Ex Endow t-1

0.06

0.26

0.69**

-0.16

(0.11)

(0.24)

(2.42)

(-0.35)

5.12***

9.89***

7.04***

15.86***

(6.27)

(6.33)

(11.68)

(14.56)

Industry, state, and year
dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R-square (%)

3.02

3.33

4.49

1.91

2.70

4.76

Observations

41,752

32,949

32,949

41,752

32,949

32,949

This table presents the results of an OLS model of the determinants of PPE GR% and PROGRAM GR%. PPE
GR is the change in land, buildings, and equipment (line 57a, column (b)) plus depreciation (line 42, column
(a)) from year t-1 to t (one year) and from t-1 to t+1 (two years). We deflate PPE GR by total expenses (line 17)
at year t-1, and multiply it by 100 to express it as a percentage of total expenses. PROGRAM GR is the change
in total program services expenses (line 13) from year t-1 to t (one year) and from t-1 to t+1 (two years). We
deflate PROGRAM GR by total expenses (line 17) at year t-1, and multiply it by 100 to express it as a
percentage of total expenses. Log Expenses is the natural logarithm of total expenses (line 17). Q4 Ex Endow is
an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution,
and ‘0’ otherwise. Persistent Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment at year t-1
is in the top quartile of the distribution and remains in the top quartile of the distribution at year t+1, and ‘0’
otherwise. Transitory Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment at year t-1 is in
the top quartile of the distribution and not in the top quartile of the distribution at year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. Tstatistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors are presented in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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Table 5 – Determinants of the Program Expense Ratio
Variable

Predicted
Sign

Intercept

Dep. Variable: PROG EXP RATIO t
I

II

III

IV

48.80***
(12.99)

50.37***
(13.30)

47.68***
(12.64)

45.23***
(10.64)

Log Expensest-1

+

2.06***
(17.11)

1.98***
(16.60)

2.15***
(17.10)

2.31***
(15.85)

Contributions% t-1

?

-3.37***
(-5.03)

-3.31***
(-4.94)

-2.93***
(-4.37)

-3.27***
(-4.15)

Liabilities t-1

?

1.20**
(2.16)

1.20**
(2.14)

1.53***
(2.73)

1.24*
(1.88)

Ex Endow t-1

-

-0.36***
(-5.29)

Positive Ex Endow t-1

-

-0.42***
(-4.55)

Negative Ex Endow t-1

0

-0.16
(-1.34)

Q4 Ex Endow t-1

-

Persistent Ex Endow t-1

-

-1.94***
(-4.20)

Transitory Ex Endow t-1

-

-1.16***
(-2.93)

Industry, state,
and year dummies
R-square (%)
Observations

-1.77***
(-5.08)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

12.63
41,752

12.67
41,752

12.19
41,752

12.62
32,949

This table presents the results of an OLS model of the determinants of PROG EXP RATIO. PROG EXP RATIO
is total program services expenses (line 13) as a percentage of total expenses (line 17). Log Expenses is the
natural logarithm of total expenses (line 17). Contributions% is the ratio of total contributions (line 1d) to total
revenue (line 12) and Liabilities is the ratio of total liabilities (line 66) to total assets (line 59). Ex Endow is the
excess level of endowment at year t-1 measured as the residual of the regression of determinants of benchmark
endowment (Table 3), where endowment is the sum of cash, savings, and investment securities (line 45, column
(b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, column (b)) deflated by total expenses (line 17). Positive (Negative) Ex
Endow is Ex Endow if Ex Endow is positive (negative or 0), and ‘0’ otherwise.
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Table 5 – Cont’d
Q4 Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of
the distribution, and ‘0’ otherwise. Persistent Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess
endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution and remains in the top quartile of the distribution
at year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. Transitory Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess
endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution and not in the top quartile of the distribution at
year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. T-statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1
percent levels.
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Table 6 – Determinants of CEO Compensation
Variable

Predicted
Sign

Intercept

Dep. Variable: CEO COMP t
I

II

III

IV

6.27***
(56.45)

6.22***
(53.08)

6.28***
(56.27)

6.35***
(51.11)

Log Expensest-1

+

0.30***
(52.04)

0.30***
(49.45)

0.30***
(51.89)

0.29***
(44.41)

Log Contributionst

+

0.03***
(7.69)

0.03***
(7.59)

0.03***
(7.34)

0.03***
(7.09)

Zero Contributionst

?

0.36***
(5.97)

0.35***
(5.82)

0.34***
(5.64)

0.36***
(5.45)

Ex Endow t-1

+

0.01*
(1.93)

Positive Ex Endow t-1

+

0.01**
(2.03)

Negative Ex Endow t-1

0

-0.00
(-0.38)

Q4 Ex Endow t-1

+

Persistent Ex Endow t-1

+

0.07***
(3.79)

Transitory Ex Endow t-1

+

0.08***
(4.08)

Industry, state, and year
dummies
R-square (%)
Observations

0.08***
(5.52)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

47.52
41,752

47.53
41,752

47.63
41,752

46.37
32,949

This table presents the results of an OLS model of the determinants of CEO Compensation (CEO COMP). CEO
COMP is the natural logarithm of CEO compensation (Form 990 – Part V, column (c) + column (d) + column
(e)). Log Expenses is the natural logarithm of total expenses (line 17). Log Contributions is the natural
logarithm of total contributions (line 1d). This variable is set to zero if total contributions equal zero. Zero
Contributions is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if total contributions equal zero, and ‘0’ otherwise. Ex Endow
is the excess level of endowment at year t-1 measured as the residual of the regression of determinants of
benchmark endowment (Table 3), where endowment is the sum of cash, savings, and investment securities (line
45, column (b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, column (b)) deflated by total expenses (line 17). Positive
(Negative) Ex Endow is Ex Endow if Ex Endow is positive (negative or 0), and ‘0’ otherwise.
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Table 6 – Cont’d
Q4 Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of
the distribution, and ‘0’ otherwise. Persistent Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess
endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution and remains in the top quartile of the distribution
at year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. Transitory Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess
endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution and not in the top quartile of the distribution at
year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. T-statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1
percent levels.
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Table 7 – Determinants of Officer and Director Compensation
Variable

Predicted
Sign

Intercept

Dep. Variable: O&D COMP%t
I

II

III

IV

30.13***
(24.53)

28.23***
(23.60)

30.18***
(24.58)

29.61***
(20.17)

Log Expensest-1

-

-1.65***
(-37.57)

-1.55***
(-37.23)

-1.66***
(-37.60)

-1.61***
(-32.52)

Log Contributionst

+

0.09***
(4.24)

0.08***
(3.71)

0.09***
(3.97)

0.09***
(3.86)

Zero Contributionst

?

1.97***
(5.75)

1.73***
(5.07)

1.91***
(5.47)

1.97***
(5.12)

Ex Endow t-1

+

0.04**
(2.01)

Positive Ex Endow t-1

+

0.12***
(4.92)

Negative Ex Endow t-1

0

-0.20***
(-5.48)

Q4 Ex Endow t-1

+

Persistent Ex Endow t-1

+

0.41***
(3.86)

Transitory Ex Endow t-1

+

0.36***
(3.55)

Industry, state, and year
dummies
R-square (%)
Observations

0.40***
(4.72)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

34.89
41,752

35.31
41,752

34.94
41,752

34.33
32,949

This table presents OLS models of the determinants of Officer and Director Compensation (O&D COMP%).
O&D COMP% is officer and director compensation(line 25, column (a)) as a percentage of total expenses (line
17). Log Expenses is the natural logarithm of total expenses (line 17). Log Contributions is the natural logarithm
of total contributions (line 1d). This variable is set to zero if total contributions equal zero. Zero Contributions is
an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if total contributions equal zero, and ‘0’ otherwise. Ex Endow is the excess
level of endowment at year t-1 measured as the residual of the regression of determinants of benchmark
endowment (Table 3), where endowment is the sum of cash, savings, and investment securities (line 45, column
(b) + line 46, column (b) + line 54, column (b)) deflated by total expenses (line 17). Positive (Negative) Ex
Endow is Ex Endow if Ex Endow is positive (negative or 0), and ‘0’ otherwise.
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Table 7 – Cont’d
Q4 Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of
the distributions, and ‘0’ otherwise. Persistent Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess
endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution and remains in the top quartile of the distribution
at year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. Transitory Ex Endow is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess
endowment at year t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution and not in the top quartile of the distribution at
year t+1, and ‘0’ otherwise. T-statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1
percent levels.
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Table 8 – Alternative Endowment Measure – Unrestricted Assets
Variable

Dependent Variable
PROG EXP RATIO

CEO COMP

O&D COMP%t

Intercept

48.25***
(12.29)

6.00***
(49.34)

30.08***
(27.00)

Log Expensest-1

1.90***
(15.24)

0.32***
(50.03)

-1.71***
(-34.09)

Log Contributionst

0.02***
(5.03)

0.05**
(2.14)

Zero Contributionst

0.26***
(3.80)

1.65***
(3.72)

-3.34***
(-8.36)

0.15***
(9.33)

0.57***
(4.95)

Yes

Yes

Yes

13.32
16,381

51.81
16,381

37.50
16,381

Contributions% t-1

Liabilities t-1

Q4 Ex Unrestricted t-1

Industry, state, and year
dummies
R-square
Observations

-2.21***
(-3.35)
1.04*
(1.78)

This table presents the results of an OLS model of the determinants of management and general expenses
(PROG EXP RATIO), CEO Compensation (CEO COMP), and Officer and Director Compensation (O&D
COMP%) using an alternative endowment measure. This data is available for the period of 1998 to 2001.
Unrestricted_Endow is unrestricted assets (line 67) deflated by total expenses (line 17). We measure excess
Unrestricted_Endow as the residual of an endowment model equivalent to the specification in Table 3. Q4 Ex
Unrestricted is an indicator variable coded as ‘1’ if the excess Unrestricted_Endow at year t-1 is in the top
quartile of the distributions and ‘0’ otherwise. All other variables are defined as before. T-statistics based on
Huber-White robust standard errors are presented in parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and ***
indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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